The Japanese had previously attempted to capture Port Moresby but the Battles of the Coral Sea (5-8 May 1942) and Midway (4-6 June) had foiled their planned amphibious attack. Therefore, in July, the Japanese army decided to attack Port Moresby from two sides: from Milne Bay, and from the north, over the Owen Stanley Range. This battle became known as the Kokoda Campaign.

The Kokoda Trail/Track
The Kokoda Trail, also known as the Kokoda Track, is a track of about 160 km (100 miles) across the Owen Stanley Range, connecting Port Moresby on the south coast of Papua New Guinea with the island’s north coast. It’s a muddy track that climbs through the ranges while the environment is rough, the climate wet and the circumstances debilitating. There’s little or no infrastructure along the track. The small village of Kokoda is situated on a small plateau on the northeastern side of the slopes. The presence of a small airstrip gave the place its strategic value during the Campaign of 1942.

The Australian Forces
Throughout early 1942, there were warnings that the Japanese intended to attack Port Moresby. Australia was responsible for defending New Guinea, but the well-equipped Australian Imperial Force (AIF) was overseas at the time. That meant Australia could only send its poorly trained militia troops to defend Port Moresby, sending its 30th militia brigade in January 1942. They had not received appropriate training and were ill prepared to fight the Japanese – some of its members had never even fired their rifles before. Yet this brigade was forced to enter the jungles of New Guinea to fight the Japanese, who had completed successful battles in China, the Philippines and Malaya.

In February 1942, the Japanese army started bombing Port Moresby, before landing their troops at Lae and Salamaua on 8 March, where they vastly outnumbered the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (NGVR). After a brief fight, the NGVR withdrew to the jungle and kept the Japanese under close surveillance. Finally, in May 1942, Australia sent reinforcements to Port Moresby. However, they didn’t send available Australian Imperial Force brigades but another low-grade militia brigade, the 14th.

The Logistics
Logistics were a nightmare in this campaign. Only one or two transport aircraft were available. The only other way to transport supplies was by foot, using native bearers. With Kokoda an 8-day trek away, a bearer would need to carry enough food to last that long and wouldn’t be able to carry that many other essential supplies. The support of the natives was also essential in the campaign. Although many of the Papuan Infantry Battalion hid in the jungle, some loyal members and natives kept on patrolling, collecting information, killing Japanese troops and carrying supplies to Allied forces. The Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU), which consisted of resident whites, also played a vital role with their knowledge of the locals and the country.

The Australian and US Air Forces bombed the Japanese beachhead at Gona-Buna, with minimal gains and high losses. Throughout the campaign, the High Command in Australia had no idea of the desperate fighting going on in Papua. Many requests for urgent resources, such as air transport, were denied. And because of the nature of the Kokoda Track, any new reinforcements that were sent would still take many days before they could join the battle. The Victorian 39th Militia Battalion was the first to oppose the Japanese in Papua. Their average age was only 18 years and 6 months.

The Battle – July 1942
To prevent the Japanese from moving across the Owen Stanley Ranges, around 300 members of the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) and the 39th Militia Battalion’s “B” Company (known as Maroubra Force) were sent in on 6 and 7 July 1942. Two weeks later, on 21 July, the Japanese arrived in the Buna-Gona area. Then on 23 July, the 39th Militia Battalion’s “C” Company also started moving towards Kokoda.

The first fight took place between a large number of Japanese troops, who were moving south from Gona-Buna, and a small platoon of the “B” Company and some Papuans, near Awala (about midway between Kokoda and Buna). A patrol led by Lt Chalk of Angau opened rifle fire on the advancing Japanese, who responded with mortars, machine guns and a mountain gun. A platoon of 39th Battalion under Lt Seekamp held the enemy for half an hour while the PIB set up defences further back. It is estimated that there were only about 100 Australian men trying to hold back around 2,000 Japanese troops. Because the strength of the Japanese was unknown, Lt Seekamp’s platoon, together with the few remaining PIB under Maj Watson, destroyed the Wairopi Bridge and withdrew to Kokoda.

Another platoon of the 39th Battalion ambushed the advancing Japanese, displaying good combat discipline, holding their fire while the Japanese deployed. After shooting around 15 Japanese troops, the Australians fell back to Oivi. Being greatly outnumbered, Lt-Col WT Owen of the 39th Battalion requested two more companies to be flown to Kokoda. However, he only received one platoon. At Oivi, the Australian were attacked and surrounded. Capt Templeton made his way back along the track to warn the approaching platoons of the ambush, but was captured and killed by the Japanese. Some of the troops at Oivi fought their way out while others escaped into the jungle and found a way around the Japanese. A nearby group of PIB and Europeans were captured and killed.

Col Owen decided to destroy the supplies at Kokoda and re-form at Deniki. But when he found out that the Japanese hadn’t taken Kokoda, he re-occupied it with his 77 exhausted men. When around 2,000 Japanese attacked Kokoda during the night on 29 July, the small group of Australians put up fierce resistance. Col Owen was killed in the fighting, and the Australians who were left, including Maj Watson of the PIB, again managed to escape the one-sided battle.

Two militia privates, who waited in Kokoda until the Japanese were almost right on top of them, managed to shoot about 15 Japanese men before withdrawing. Over the next few days, the remaining companies of the 39th Battalion joined Maroubra Force, however the Japanese still greatly outnumbered the Australians. The Australian forces retaliated as best they could against the veteran Japanese troops in the jungle, but were forced to conduct fighting withdrawals, i.e. to fight, stop the enemy, and then withdraw to avoid being annihilated.

Some members of D Company, 39th Battalion, returning to their base camp after a battle at Isurava.
Right to left: Warrant Officer 2 R. Marsh, Privates G. Palmer, J. Manol, J. Tonkins, A. Forrester and Gallipoli veteran Staff Sergeant J. Long.

Fighting Withdrawal – August to October 1942
The 39th Battalion was down to just 460 men while the Papuan battalion only had 43 men remaining. On 6 August, Maj AG Cameron arrived. He took command and tried to retake Kokoda on 8 August. Although one company briefly succeeded in occupying Kokoda, they had to withdraw to Deniki the next day due to heavy casualties. Between 9 and 14 August, the Australian troops managed to hold back several enemy attacks, but the exhausted men had little food and ammunition left and were forced to withdraw to Isurava during the night of 14-15 August.

Meanwhile, Australia had dispatched reinforcements to New Guinea in the form of the 7th Division. The 21st Brigade went to Port Moresby while the 18th Brigade went to Milne Bay. On 12 August, Lt-Gen Sidney Rowell took command at Port Moresby, Brig SHWC Porter of the 30th Brigade took command in the Owen Stanley Ranges and Lt-Col Ralph Honner took command of the 39th Battalion, which was being joined by the 53rd Battalion. Upon hearing that reinforcements were on the way, the battered remains of the 39th Battalion were determined to hold out, even in the face of the 10,000 fighting troops of the Japanese.

On 23 August, Brig Arnold Potts of the 21st Brigade AIF arrived at Isurava, which continued to be furiously attacked over the next few days by the Japanese. On 26 August, the first parties of Brig Potts’ 2/14th and 2/16th Infantry Battalions started to arrive. The survivors of the 39th Battalion, who had been desperately awaiting promised relief, were then attacked again by the Japanese and decided to stay and assist the AIF. The exhausted members of the 39th Battalion were in awe of the fit and well-equipped members of the 2/14th, while in turn, those members were surprised that the ragged remains of the 39th were still able to fight in their condition.

The 39th, 2/14th, 2/16th and 53rd Infantry Battalions continued the battle under Brig Potts. They fought and covered each other’s withdrawals in the confused fighting, until the 53rd Battalion was removed from the fight. The fighting withdrawal continued through Alola, Eora Creek, Templeton’s Crossing, Myola and Effogi.

On 5 September, the 2/27th Infantry Battalion joined Brig Potts’ forces at Mission Ridge above Effogi, replacing the remnants of the 39th Battalion. When the 50 remaining members of the 39th were finally withdrawn, they were in awful shape, suffering from fever, malaria, hookworm and scrub typhus, while their boots and uniforms had basically rotted through. During the Kokoda Campaign, 58 members of the 39th Battalion had died and 125 were wounded.

Retaking of Kokoda – 2 November 1942
The 2/27th, 2/14th and 2/16th Infantry Battalions continued the fight along the Kokoda Trail until they were joined by further reinforcements, including the 3rd Militia Battalion, 25th Brigade AIF and others. By now, the Japanese were exhausted by the long fighting withdrawal, which was begun by the 39th and Papuan Battalions, and continued under Brig Potts, and were being forced back while the reinforced Australians started pushing forward. The Allied forces finally retook Kokoda on 2 November and continued their advance to the northern beaches.